Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Darwin Kocherhans v. City of Orem, and Jeffrey W.
Pedersen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Justin D. Heideman; Heideman, McKay, Heugly & Olsen; Attorneys for Appellant.
Stanley J. Preston; Bryan M. Scott; Stephen J. Preston; Preston and Scott; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Kocherhans v. City of Orem, No. 20100565 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2427

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

I N T H E UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

DARWIN KOCHERHANS,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DARWIN KOCHERHANS

Plaintiff/Appellant,
Appellate Case No. 20100565-CA
vs.
CITY OF OREM, and JEFFREY W.
PEDERSEN,
Defendants/Appellees.

Appeal from Order Dismissing Case of the Fourth Judicial District Court
and for Utah County, State of Utah.
Justin D. Heideman (USB 8897)
HEIDEMAN, MCKAY, HEUGLY &
OLSEN, LLC
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Darwin
Kocherhans
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 180
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 801-812-1000
Facsimile: 801-374-1724
Email: jheideman@hmho-law.com

Stanley J. Preston
Bryan M. Scott
PRESTON & SCOTT
Attorneysfcr Defendant/ Appellee Orem City and
Jeffrey W. Pedersen
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone- 801-869 1620
Facsimile: 8t! 1-869-1621
Email: sjp@ j3resLonCvndscott.com
bms(«)prestonandscott.com

IN T H E UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

DARWIN KOCHERHANS,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DARWIN KOCHERHANS

Plaintiff/ Appellant,
Appellate Case N o . 20100565-CA
vs.

CITY OF OREM, and JEFFREY W.
PEDERSEN,
Defendants/Appellees.

Appeal from Order Dismissing Case of the Fourth Judicial District Court
and for Utah County, State of Utah.
Justin D. Heideman (USB 8897)
HEIDEMAN, MCKAY, HEUGLY &
OLSEN, LLC
Attorneyfor Plaintiff/Appellant Darwin
Kocherhans
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 180
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 801-812-1000
Facsimile: 801-374-1724
Email: jheideman@hmho-law.com

Stanley J. Preston
Bryan M. Scott
PRESTON & SCOTT
Attorneysfor Defendant/Appellee Orem City and
Jeffrey W. Pedersen
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 801-869-1620
Facsimile: 801-869-1621
Email: sjp@ prestonandscott.com
bms@prestonandscott.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

Page

Table of Contents

i

Table of Authorities

iii

Statement of Jurisdiction

1

Issues Presented for Review

1

Statement of the Case

1

Statement of the Facts

3

Summary of the Argument

7

Argument

8

1.

2.

The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's claims on the basis that Appellant
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not appeal the Board's
decision to the Utah Court of Appeals and instead filed in district court

8

A.

Standard of Review

8

B.

The trial court preemptively and improperly determined that Appellant was
not "a head of a municipal department" or a "deputy of a head of a
municipal department" and was therefore required to appeal the Board's
final decision to the Utah Court of Appeals
8

C.

If Appellant was not subject to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, he did not
need to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing an appeal with the
Utah Court of Appeals, and resjudicata would not bar his Complaint before
the district court
13

The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's claim for "wrongful termination" on
the basis that the City's Handbook did not create an implied contract between the
City and Appellant
14
A.

Standard of Review

14

B.

The trial court ignored the fact that Appellant's "wrongful termination"
claim was based upon allegations that Appellants did not follow their own
internal policies and procedures
14

Conclusion

22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 161 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988)
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 131 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987)
Barms v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 205, 398 P.2d 207 (1965)
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon &Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483 (Utah 1989)
Greene v. Howard Univ., All F.2d 1128 (D.C.Cir.1969)
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991)
Kari v. General Motors Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978)
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985)
Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983)
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)
Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich.App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981)
Statutes
Orem City Code
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 2-26-12
§ 10-3-1105
§ 10-3-1106
§ 78A-4-103

Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 12
Addenda
Addendum 1: Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991)

1, 8,14
8,14
8,14
17
16
15,16,17,18, 21
17
8,14
1, 8,14
16
17
6
2, 7, 8,10,11,13
2, 7, 9,10,12,13
1
8,14

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0.
ISSUES P R E S E N T E D FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellant's claims on the basis that
Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not
appeal the Board's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals and instead filed in
district court?
Standard of review: Correctness. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668 (Utah
1989). Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988); Penrod
v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983).
Issue Preserved at: [R. 254; 290-294; 343-347].

2.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellant's claim for "wrongful
termination" on the basis that the City's employee manual did not create an
implied contract between the City and Appellant?
Standard of review: Correctness. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 119 P.2d 668 (Utah
1989). Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Naf I Bank, 161 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988); Penrod
v. Nu Creation Crerne, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983).
Issue Preserved at: [R. 214; 252-253; 287-289; 340-343].
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE

Nature of the Case.
1.

The Appellant in this case (who was Plaintiff in the underlying trial case) is Darwin
Kocherhans (hereinafter, "Appellant") a resident of Utah County, Utah.

2.

The Appellees in this case are Orem City (hereinafter, the "City"), a Utah municipal
corporation [R. 260] and Jeffrey W. Pedersen (hereinafter, "Pedersen"), employed by
or acting as agent of the City of Orem. [R. 260].

3.

For ease of reference, this Brief will refer to the City and Pedersen together as the
"Appellees."

4.

This appeal requires the Court to determine the following questions of law:
(1)

Whether : (a) Appellant qualifies for exemption under Utah Code Ann. § 10-31105; (b) Appellant must exhaust the remedies set forth in Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1106 even though Appellant is exempt from the procedural requirements
of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105; and (c) the City's Handbook sufficiently
defines Appellant's position vis-a-vis Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105's
definitions for "head of a department" and "deputy of a head of a
department."

(2)

Whether the language in Orem's Employee Manual, Section 3 "Human
Resource Policies and Procedures Manual," which provides "[n]othing in this
manual implies or is part of an employment contract" negates Appellant's
claim for wrongful termination under an implied employment contract and
where Appellant has alleged that Appellees violated Section 3 policies with
respect to notice of performance deficiencies and termination.

Course of Proceedings/Disposition of trial court.
5.

On August 10, 2009, Appellant filed a Complaintlin the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County against Appellees. [R. 217].

6.

In the Complaint, Appellant alleged the following seven causes of action:
(1)

Wrongful Termination;

(2)

Breach of Contract;

7.

(3)

Tortious Interference with Current and Prospective Economic Relations;

(4)

Defamation, Slander, and Libel;

(5)

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress;

(6)

Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment; and

(7)

Respondeat Superior [R. 217].

Appellees filed an Ex-parte Motion for heave to File Overlength Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Dismiss on September 9, 2009. [R. 222].

8.

On September 11, 2009, the trial court granted Appellees' Motion for Leave to File
Overlength Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Appellees filed
their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. [R. 229; 268].

9.

On October 8, 2009, Appellant submitted a Memorandum in Response to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss. [R. 300].

10.

Appellees filed an Ex-parte Motion for Leave to File Overlength Reply Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and their accompanying memorandum on
October 29, 2009. [R. 303; 321].

11.

On October 30, 2009, Appellees filed a Request to Submitfor Decision. [R. 324].

12.

After the trial court heard oral arguments on February 4-5, 2010 and again on March
30, 2010, the court entered a Memorandum Decision on April 21, 2010. [R. 351].

13.

On June 9, 2010, the district court filed an Order Dismissing Case. [R. 354].

14.

Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal on July 7, 2010. \R. 358].
STATEMENT OF T H E FACTS

15.

The City is a government municipality within Utah County, Utah. Pedersen is the

Administrative Services Director for the City. [R. 217].
16.

Appellant held various positions with the City during the course of his 28-year
employment there. [R. 216].

17.

While employed with the City, Appellant consistently received better than average
and exemplary performance ratings. [R. 216].

18.

Appellant was promoted from Assistant Treasurer to Treasury Division Manager
(City Treasurer) in 2006 and continued to receive above-satisfactory performance
reviews in this new position, including the review received only five months prior to
his termination. [R. 216].

19.

On September 15, 2008, Appellant received a Notice of Intent to Terminate ("Notice")
from his supervisor, Pedersen. In the Notice^ Pedersen noted that Appellant had a
"pattern of neglect of duty, frequent errors and a general inability to complete the
functions of [the] office." [R. 176-178; 216; 350].

20.

Pursuant to administrative procedures outlined in the Orem Employee Handbook,
(hereinafter, "Handbook"), Appellant timely appealed the termination decision to
Pedersen. [R. 215-216; 260].

21.

Pedersen was both the supervisor issuing the termination notice and the Director
who was to review the decision to terminate Appellant. [R. 215].

22.

Pedersen denied Appellant's appeal. [R. 215; 260].

23.

Pedersen terminated Appellant effective September 24, 2008 for "performance
deficiencies." [R. 215].

24.

According to the "Disciplinary Procedures" outlined in the City's Handbook on

pages 131 through 141, there are a number of informal and formal disciplinary
actions that may be taken prior termination. Specifically, on page 131 under the
heading "Disciplinary Procedure", Policy 2 indicates that "Disciplinary actions shall
be limited in severity commensurate with the infraction(s) in question and/or past
infractions." [R. 44; 215].
25.

Prior to receiving the Notice, Appellant had never been subject to any disciplinary
notice or proceedings. Furthermore, prior to issuing the Notice, the City took no steps
to correct any errors or address any performance concerns through "informal" action
or discipline.1 [R. 214].

26.

Appellant was never trained by his supervisor with respect to some of the alleged
mistakes, and did not receive any notice to correct mistakes after the errors were
committed. [R. 174].

27.

Pedersen's remarks in the Notice were made part of Appellant's employee record and
were used by the City of Orem Employee Appeal Board (the "Board") in determining
the outcome of Appellant's appeal of the termination decision. [R. 212; 259].

28.

On December 11, 2008, the Board heard Appellant's appeal contesting his
termination by the City. [R. 230-234; 259].

29.

During the appeal hearing, Appellant was represented by counsel. Both Appellant
and the City offered witnesses and exhibits and had the right to cross-examine the
other party's witnesses. [R. 230-234; 259].

1

The City's Handbook distinguishes between "Informal Action" (verbal reprimand,
corrective interviews, written reprimand) and "Formal Disciplinary Action" (suspension,
without pay, reduction in salary, demotion, supplemental probation, dismissal, or any
combination of the foregoing).

In its decision issued on December 15, 2008, the Board made several findings of fact
including the following: (1) Appellant incorrectly transmitted payroll information to
the City's bank; (2) the payroll error caused significant problems for a number of City
employees; (3) Appellant made two mistakes wiring funds to a bond trust fund that
were in excess of 1.2 million dollars; (4) the wire transfers were part of a larger
pattern of inattention to detail; (5) Appellant repeatedly wired wrong amounts for
Roth IRAs; (6) Appellant incorrecdy entered water bill base rates which necessitated
issuing refunds to water users; (7) Appellant was two months late making a bond
payment; (8) Appellant failed to respond timely to voicemails and failed to attend
scheduled meetings; (9) Appellant did not have the support and confidence of his coworkers and supervisor; (10) Appellant was on constructive notice that his job
performance was deficient based on his fellow employees numerous attempts to
bring his shortcomings to his attention; (11) Appellant exercised a lackadaisical
attitude toward his duties and failed to perform his job with the standard of care
required in such a sensitive position; and (12) Appellant's job performance
constituted a serious violation of City policy in terms of incompetence, inefficiency,
neglect of duty, conduct causing discredit to the City and failure to meet expected
performance levels such that termination was warranted. [R. 230-234; 259].
The Board also concluded as a matter of law (among other things) that Pedersen's
decision to terminate Appellant was neither arbitrary or capricious, that there was
substantial evidence (per Orem City Code § 2-26-12) to support Pedersen's decision,
and that Appellant's performance constituted a serious violation of City policy in

terms of incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty, conduct causing discredit to the
City and failure to meet expected performance levels such that immediate termination
was warranted. [R. 231].
32.

Appellant filed a Complaint m the Fourth District Court on August 10, 2009. [R. 217].
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The district court erroneously determined that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 required Appellant to file an appeal of the Board's decision with the
Utah Court of Appeals and that his failure to do resulted in a failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Appellant's position as Treasury Division Manager can arguable be
deemed to be a "head of a department" or a "deputy of a head of department" position.
Accordingly, Appellant was exempted under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2)(g)&(h) from
the appeal requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106.
The trial court also erred in dismissing Appellant's "wrongful termination" claim. The
trial court focused exclusively on the fact that Section 3 of the City's Handbook contained a
provision disclaiming the creation of contractual obligations while ignoring the fact that
relevant case law allows for the modification of the at-will employment status when an
employment manual contains specific policies and procedures, and the employer fails to
follow those policies and procedures. An implied contract may arise in such circumstances.

w
w
w

ARGUMENT

1.

The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's claims on the basis that
Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not
appeal the Board's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals and instead filed in
district court.
A.

Standard of Review.

In reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), an
appellate court will review only the facts alleged in the complaint, accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc.,
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989). Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nafl Bank, 161 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah
1988); Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). The reviewing court
will affirm the dismissal only if it is apparent that as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not
recover under the facts alleged. See Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat*I Bank, 767 P.2d at 936;
Barms v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 205, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (1965); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Because the appellate court only considers the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the trial
court's ruling is given no deference and is reviewed under a correctness standard. See Atlas
Corp. v. Clovis Nat'lBank, 131 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714,
716 (Utah 1985).
B.

The trial court preemptively and improperly determined that Appellant
was not a a head of a municipal department" or a "deputy of a head of a
municipal department" and was therefore required to appeal the
Board's final decision to the Utah Court of Appeals.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court framed the legal issue of the exhaustion of
Appellant's administrative remedies and the application of Utah's Municipal Code (Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-201 etseq.) as follows: Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2) specifically

exempts from the hearing and appeal requirements in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 certain
municipal employees including "a head of a municipal department" and "a deputy of a head
of a municipal department." According to the trial court, the only material issue of law is
related to the City's Handbook and whether the Handbook defines Appellant as a "head of a
municipal department" or "a deputy head of a municipal department." [R. 346-347].
The trial court then analyzed the following definitions found in the Handbook [R.
346]:
(1)

Department Director. "The individual designated as the administrative head of a
department and designated as the Department Director for that department."
{See Handbook, p. 115). [R. 60].

(2)

Executive Management Employees: "Employees in classifications designated as
Executive Management who are Department Directors and serve at the
pleasure of the City Manager. These employees constitute the executive staff
of the City and do not receive the grievance and appeals rights provided in these policies
andprocedures." {See Handbook, p. 116). [R. 59].

(3)

Management Employees'. "Employees of the City who are filling management
positions as determined by the City Manager." {See Handbook, p. 116). [R. 59].

The trial court noted that in Section 1 of the Handbook, City employees are classified
as either "exempt" or "non-exempt" for purposes of coverage under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. {See Handbook, p. 33-35). [R. 140-142; 345]. In that classification section, the
justifications for the exemptions are listed in the right column next to each position. There
are four possible justifications: "management," "executive," "professional," and

"administrative."
The trial court posited that Pedersen's position (as "Administrative Services
Director") is exempted as an "executive" position. Furthermore, most of the other
"executive" positions include the term director in their tide. Appellant's position as
"Treasury Division Manager" is exempted in Section 1 because it is "management" and not
because it is "executive."
The trial court relied upon the categorization of Appellant's position as
"management" (and not "executive") in determining that Appellant was a "Management
Employee" and not and "Executive Management Employee." The trial court further pointed
out that Appellant's job title did not include the term "Department Director" or "Executive
Management Employee." For this reason, the trial court ruled that as a "Management
Employee," Appellant was subject to the grievance procedures outlined in the Handbook.
[R. 345].
After establishing these definitional conclusions, the trial court then considered the
relevant Municipal Code sections (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2) and § 10-3-1106). The
trial court extrapolated that because Appellant did not "direct a department" (although he did
have supervisory authority over other employees) and because nothing in his job title defined
Appellant as a "deputy" to the head of a municipal department, Appellant did not fall under
any of the categories of employees in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2) that are exempted
from the appellate procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106.
The trial court reasoned that because Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6) indicates that a
final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing

with that court a petition for review within 30 days after issuance of the final action or order
of the appeal board, and because Appellant did not file with the Court of Appeals (but
rather, with the district court), Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and
was precluded from seeking judicial review at the district court level. [R. 343-345].
The trial court's blanket conclusion that Appellant was not the "head of a
department" or a "deputy of a head of a municipal department" [R. 344-345] is simply not
supportable because the terms "head of a municipal department" and "deputy of a head of a
municipal department" are not defined or utilized in the Handbook.
The trial court suggests that, unlike the Appellant's position as Treasury Division
Manager, the position of "Assistant City Manager" could be "argued as a 'deputy head of a
municipal department' within the meaning of the Municipal Code." 2 [R. 344]. The trial court
does not explain how or why the position of "Assistant City Manager" might be considered
a "deputy of a head of a municipal department." The trial court merely concludes that
nothing in the Handbook supports an argument that Appellant was either a director or a
deputy director and therefore excluded from the grievance process. [R. 344].
The problem with this generalization is that the statutory definitions found in Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2)(g)&(h) are not utilized in the Handbook. Certainly, it is an issue
of fact whether a "Treasury Division Manager" could be deemed to be a "head of a
municipal department." 3 Appellant was manager of a division within the City's municipal

2

Technically, the trial court is mistaken in using the term "deputy head of a municipal
department." The term used in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2) (h) is "a deputy of a head of a
municipal department." (Emphasis added).
3
The trial court repeatedly equates "head of a municipal department" with "director,"
although there is nothing in the Handbook to support such an equation.

offices and (as acknowledged by the trial court) supervised other employees.
Moreover, it is entirely arguable that Appellant was a "deputy" of the City Manager or
Assistant City Manager in undertaking his duties as the Treasury Division Manager. While
Appellant's duties were undertaken in relation to the City's financial/treasury operations,
Appellant was delegated certain authority to act on behalf of the City Manager and/or
Assistant City Manager in that sphere. Because a "deputy" is generally defined as a person
duly authorized by an officer to serve as his or her substitute by performing some or all of
the officer's functions, Appellant could quite easily be considered a deputy of a head of a
department.4
The trial court should have allowed Appellant the full and fair opportunity to
exonerate his position that he was either a "head of a municipal department" or a "deputy of
a head of a municipal department" rather than relying upon vague inferences drawn from
statutory terms that are not even included in the Handbook. If Appellant can establish that
he functioned as either a head of a municipal department or as a deputy of a head of a
municipal department, he would not be subject to the review requirements Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-3-1106, and accordingly, he was entided to file his Complaintwith the district court.
Additionally, it is irrelevant that Appellant actually sought (and obtained) review of
Pedersen's termination Notice in accordance with the Handbook's Section 3 procedures.
Even if Appellant can be classified as a "Management Employee," and he was not exempted
from the City's internal termination review procedure, it does not necessarily follow that he
was subject to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. Furthermore, Appellant's
4

See any number of definitions of the word (e.g. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/deputy;
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deputy; http://www.dictionary.net/deputy).

willingness to follow the internal appeals procedure outlined in the Handbook does not
necessarily mean that he was legally obligated to do so because he was a "Management
Employee" as opposed to an "Executive Management Employee."

C.

If Appellant was not subject to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, he did not
need to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing an appeal with the
Utah Court of Appeals, and res judicata would not bar his Complaint
before the district court.

The trial court ruled that Appellant was required to appeal the Board's decision to the
Utah Court of Appeals, and that by not doing so he failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. The trial court also indicated that under the four-pronged analysis for determining
the applicability of res judicata, all four prongs were met and Appellant's Complaint was barred.
[R. 344]. Appellant contends on appeal that the fourth prong (final judgment on the merits)
was not met insofar as the Board's decision was subject to appeal to the district court.
Appellant also asserts that he exhausted his administrative remedy at the time the Board
rendered its final decision upholding his termination. Because he was not required to appeal
the final decision of the Board to the Utah Court of Appeals (inasmuch as Appellant asserts
he was either "head of a department" or a "deputy of a head of a department" under Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and thus exempted from Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106), the
Complaintwas properly filed with the district court.

2.

The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's claim for "wrongful
termination" on the basis that the City's Handbook did not create an implied
contract between the City and Appellant.
A.

Standard of Review.

In reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), an
appellate court will review only the facts alleged in the complaint, accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc.,
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989). Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Naf I Bank, 161 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah
1988); Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). The reviewing court
will affirm the dismissal only if it is apparent that as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not
recover under the facts alleged. Sec Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 161 P.2d at 936;
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 205, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (1965); Utah R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).
Because the appellate court only considers the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the trial
court's ruling is given no deference and is reviewed under a correctness standard. See Atlas
Corp. v. ClovisNaflBank, 131 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714,
716 (Utah 1985).
B.

The trial court ignored the fact that Appellant's "wrongful termination"
claim was based upon allegations that Appellants did not follow their
own internal policies and procedures.

The trial court determined that under relevant Utah case law, Section 3 (Human
Resource Policies and Procedures Manual) of the City's Handbook specifically disclaimed
any contractual liability as to the human resources policy. Section 3 addresses performance
evaluations, grievances and disciplinary action; however, due to the fact that Section 3

contains a disclaimer negating the creation of any employment contract, Appellant could not
legally claim that he had an implied contract with the City and sue for "wrongful
termination." [R. 341].
The Utah Supreme Court provided guidance on the question of when an employee
manual gives rise to an implied contract in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah
1991).
It is clear that the employee has the burden of establishing the existence of an
implied-in-fact contract provision, that is, the employee must show that
although there was no express contract provision to this effect, the parties
nevertheless agreed that the employment would not be at will. If the parties
actually intended such an agreement and the agreement is of such a nature that
it is possible to operate as a contract term, a court will give effect to the
parties' intentions by enforcing the agreement as an implied-in-fact contract
provision. The existence of such an agreement is a question of fact
which turns on the objective manifestations of the parties' intent. As a
question of fact, the intent of the parties is primarily a jury question.
However, if the evidence presented is such that no reasonable jury could
conclude that the parties agreed to limit the employer's right to terminate the
employee, it is appropriate for a court to decide the issue as a matter of law.
(Internal citations omitted). (Emphasis added).
Id. at 1001.
Notwithstanding the fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry in determining the parties'
intent, the Johnson Court found that the employee manual at issue contained "clear and
conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual liability and stating [the employer's] intent
to maintain an at-will relationship with its employees." Id. at 1004. The Johnson Court gave
particular attention to the following language contained in the manual:
This book is provided for general guidance only. The policies and procedures
expressed in this book, as well as those in any other personnel materials which
may be issued from time to time, do not create a binding contract or any other
obligation or liability on the company. Your employment is for no set period
and may be terminated without notice and at will at any time by you or the

company. The company reserves the right to change these policies and
procedures at any time for any reason.
Id. at 1003.
Because of the "clear and conspicuous" language of the disclaimer, the Johnson Court
upheld the dismissal of the employee's implied contract claim. Nevertheless, the Johnson
Court clearly distinguished between an employee who alleges that an employment handbook
creates an implied contract requiring "good cause" for termination versus a claim that an
employer has wrongfully terminated the employee in contravention of its own internal
policies and procedures:
Therefore, the procedures in the handbook for terminating an employee must
be read in light of the language in the disclaimer which clearly reserved the
right to discharge for any reason. Under such an approach, the most
Johnson is entitled to is the right to challenge his termination under the
handbook's procedures, not the right to be fired only for good cause.
(Emphasis added).
Wat 1003.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart expanded upon this concept by observing
that: "[t]he law increasingly recognizes that informal understandings and usages may be
implied into contracts." Id. at 1005.
Justice Stewart further explained:
In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court recognized that an employer's de facto policies
may give rise to a contractually enforceable employee right to be discharged
for just cause only, even in the presence of an employee policy manual
statement to the contrary. Id at 600, 603, 92 S.Ct. at 2699, 2700. There are
also federal and state court decisions which hold that course of conduct may
negate the effect of written disclaimers designed to insulate employers from
contractual liability. See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1134-35
(D.C.Cir.1969) (disclaimer asserting no contractual duty on the part of
employer does not necessarily relieve employer of all obligations with respect

to the observance of its regulations); Karl v. General Motors Corp,, 402 Mich.
926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978) (reversed lower court's grant of summary
judgment, remanded to consider employee claims regarding interpretation of
employee handbook and reliance thereon, notwithstanding disclaimer
purporting to limit any employer contractual obligations); Schipani v. Ford Motor
Co., 102 Mich.App. 606, 612-14, 302 N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (1981) (rejected for
other reasons in Kostello v. Rockwell Infl Corp., 189 Mich.App. 241, 472 N.W.2d
71 (1991)) (under appropriate circumstances, oral promises may negate the
effect of disclaimers which are intended to absolve employers from liability for
policies presented in employee handbook). (Internal footnote omitted).
This Court has held that "an employer's internally adopted policies and
procedures concerning discharge can be sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of at-will employment and can, in effect, become part of
the contractual relationship between the employer and the employee"
and that "[bjreach of the terms of this contractual relationship can result in
damages determined as in any other breach of contract action." Caldwell v.
Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989) (citing Berube,
111 P.2d at 1044-46, 1050 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052-53
(Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result)). That principle may also have
the effect of overcoming express assertions that a contract is at-will.
(Emphasis added).
Id. at 1005.
Justice Stewart's ultimate point is that notwithstanding an employer's clear and
conspicuous disclaimer of the creation of an implied contract between itself and an
employee, the enactment of policies and procedures concerning termination or discharge by
an employer can give rise to an implied contract between the employer and employee. In
such circumstances, the employer has a contractual obligation to abide by its own policies
and procedures.
If the issue were whether there is a material issue of fact as to whether the
declared at-will relationship had been modified in any way at all by implied
terms arising from Thiokol's conduct and the other terms in the manual, there
would be a material issue of fact, because Thiokol has indicated in its manual
and in practice that it terminates employees only after certain procedures are
followed. The employee handbook contains a detailed program setting forth
specific rules of conduct, procedures for disciplinary actions, including

discharge, and procedures for employee grievances. The handbook also sets
forth types of conduct for which disciplinary action would or could be
imposed and the possible consequences. Thiokol in fact followed those
procedures in the past with respect to plaintiff and in the instant case by
complying with the extensive grievance procedures set forth in the manual.
Thus, there is clear evidence of an implied-in-fact contract term with respect
to procedures to be followed when an employee is disciplined or discharged.
The statement of these procedures in Thiokol's manual and their
implementation clearly could remove the employment relationship from a
strict at-will relationship. To that extent, a jury certainly could find that the atwill relationship had been modified, notwithstanding the manual's statement
that employment was on an at-will basis.
Id. at 1006.
When the Johnson opinion is read in toto, it is clear that the Court upheld dismissal of
the Johnson's claim because he alleged that he could not be terminated without "just cause"
rather than that his employer failed to follow its own policies and procedures as outlined in
the employment manual. Id. at 1003-1004, 1006. The Court recognized the possibility that a
claim for violation of internal policies and procedures by an employer could lie (or at least
present triable issues of fact) even where an employer has disclaimed the formation of an
employment contract through clear and conspicuous language.
The Johnson Court did not hold that an employee manual could never give rise to an
implied contract, but rather held that the existence of an implied employment agreement is a
question of fact that turns on the objective manifestation of the parties' intent. The employer's
intent and the terms of the employment relationship can be partially ascertained through the
policies and procedures established in the employment manual for employee termination are
legitimate sources for determining the apparent intentions of the parties and for fixing the
terms of the employment relationship. Id. at 1000.
The trial court in the instant case focused exclusively on the fact that Section 3

(Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual) of the City's Handbook contained "clear
and conspicuous" disclaimer language.5 [R. 340-341]. The trial court correctly pointed out
that the opening paragraph of Section 3 indicates: "[njothing in this manual implies or is part
of an employment contract." [R. 51; 341]. According to the trial court, because Section 3
addresses performance evaluations, grievances, disciplinary action, termination and appeals
processes and because it is these procedures and policies that formed the basis for
Appellant's wrongful termination claim, there could be no implied contract (as a result of the
general disclaimer), and thus, Appellant's wrongful termination claim must fail as a matter of
law. [R. 340].
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court entirely failed to recognize or address the
fact that Appellant's wrongful termination claim was based wholly on allegations that
Appellees failed to follow their own policies and procedures. In the initial Complaint,
Appellant specifically alleged the following inconsistencies in Appellees' actions vis-a-vis the
Handbook:
(1)

The City promoted Appellant to the position of City Treasurer according to
the Handbook's promotion guidelines in May 2006. [R. 54; 214].

(2)

From May 2006 to March 2008, Appellant received above-satisfactory scores
on his performance evaluations. [The evaluations were attached as Exhibit " 1 "
to the Complaint and are included at R. 180-207. See also R. 214].

(3)

Plaintiffs first indication that there was an issue with his performance
occurred on or about September 6, 2008. [R. 214].

5

The trial court admitted that only Section 3 of the Handbook contains such a disclaimer
and that Sections 1, 2, and 4 contain no such disclaimer. [R. 341].

(4)

Appellant addressed and remedied any performance deficiency as soon as he
was advised by Appellees. [R. 214].

(5)

Appellant first received notice of concerns about his performance on
September 6, 2008. Plaintiff had no real opportunity to improve his
performance and the City took no intermediate disciplinary action prior to his
prompt termination on September 24, 2008. [R. 213].

(6)

During and between September 6, 2008 and his termination two weeks later,
Appellant was provided no additional training and no additional guidelines on
how to improve his performance. [R. 213].

(7)

Appellees terminated Appellant in violation of Appellee's own established
policies. [R. 213].

(8)

Appellees terminated Appellant without proper notice and procedure. [R.213].

(9)

According to the "Disciplinary Procedures" outlined in the Handbook on
pages 131 through 141 [R. 34-44], there are a number of informal and formal
disciplinary actions that may be taken prior termination. [R. 215].

(10)

Specifically, on page 131 under "Disciplinary Procedure," Policy 2 provides:
"Disciplinary actions shall be limited in severity commensurate with the
infraction(s) in question and/or past infractions." [R. 44; 215].

(11)

Policy 5 on page 132 indicates: "Nothing contained in these Policies and
Procedures shall preclude dismissal. . . without prior notice and a hearing
where the continued presence of the employee would present a hazard or
disruption to employees, the public, or the City." [R. 43; 215].

(12)

Neither Pedersen's Notice nor anything in the record on appeal before the
Board contains an assertion that Appellant's continued presence would have
presented "a hazard or disruption to employees, the public, or the City." [R.
215].

(13)

Appellant specifically explained in his September 24, 2008 appeal letter that
the mistakes referred to in the Notice were made over a two-week period and
that he had provided exceptional service as an employee of the City for 28
years. [R. 174]. Appellant also noted that he had never received training and
was unaware of certain mistakes that he had made because he was never
notified of them and given a chance to correct them. [R. 174].

Appellant contends that despite the City's statement in its employee manual that
"[n]othing in this manual implies or is part of an employment contract," the balance of the
Handbook (which provides specific guidelines by which employees will be terminated, the
City's policies and procedures, and the City's actions regarding other similarly situated
employees) creates an implied contract with respect to those policies and procedures, and
that Appellant was entitied to rely on such policies and procedures.
Plaintiff further contends that the Johnson decision requires clear and conspicuous
language that both:(l) disclaims contractual liability, and (2) establishes an at-will
employment relationship. Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1003. The relevant disclaimer provision in
Johnson contained both a disclaimer of contractual obligation and a clear statement that
employment was for "no set period and may be terminated at will." The provision in Section
3 of the City's Handbook disclaims the creation of an employment contract but does not

designate employees as "at will."
The trial court narrowly focused on the "clear and conspicuous" language of the
Johnson ruling while ignoring language that contemplates the viability of a claim based on
allegations that an employer failed to follow its own internal policies and procedures. Taking
the facts asserted in Appellant's Complaint and Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in the light most favorable to Appellant, this Court should reverse the trial court's
dismissal of Appellant's claim for wrongful termination. Appellant has articulated facts
sufficient to raise a triable issue on the claim for wrongful termination.
CONCLUSION

For the above-state reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the trial court's dismissal of those claims outlined herein.

Respectfully submitted this Ifl day of December 2010.
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ADDENDUM " 1 "
(Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah
1991))
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Billy JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MORTON THIOKOL, INC., Defendant and Appellee.
No. 890315.
Sept. 5, 1991.
Employee brought action against former employer to
recover damages resulting from involuntary termination of his employment. The First District Court, Box
Elder County, Franklin L. Gunnell, J., entered summary judgment in favor of employer, and employee
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that
neither handbook setting forth termination procedures
nor employer's compliance with those procedures
created implied-in-fact contract modifying at-will
employment relationship, where handbook contained
clear and conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual liability and stating employer's intent to
maintain at-will relationship with employees.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., filed separate opinion concurring in result, in which Durham, J., concurred.
West Headnotes
HI Appeal and Error 30 €==>863
30 Appeal and Error
3QXVI Review
30XVKA) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Appeal and Error 30 €=>934(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKG) Presumptions

30k934 Judgment
30k934(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When reviewing order granting summary judgment,
evidence and all inferences that may be reasonably
drawn from evidence must be liberally construed in
favor of party opposing motion; determination of
whether, given this view of evidence, moving party is
entitled to judgment is question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.
121 Labor and Employment 231H €==>40(2)
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk37 Term, Duration, and Termination
231Hk40 Definite or Indefinite Term; Employment At-Will
231Hk40(2) k. Termination; Cause or
Reason in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k20 Master and Servant)
Employee hired for indefinite period is presumed to
be employee at will who can be terminated for any
reason whatsoever so long as termination does not
violate state or federal statute.
131 Labor and Employment 231H €^>759
231H Labor and Employment
231HV11I Adverse Employment Action
231HV11KA) In General
231Hk759 k. Public Policy Considerations
in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k30(1.10) Master and Servant)
Existence and scope of public policy exception to atwill doctrine have yet to be clearly established in
Utah.
HI Labor and Employment 231H €^=>50
231H Labor and Employment
231H1 In General
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy
Statements
231Hk50 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant)
Terms of employee manual can operate as implied-
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in-fact contract terms rebutting presumption of atwill employment and fixing terms of employee relationship, and continued performance of employee's
duties is adequate consideration for such implied
contract provision; it is not necessary to show express
or implied stipulation as to duration of employment
or consideration beyond rendering of services under
employment contract.
151 Labor and Employment 231H C^>55
231H Labor and Employment
231 HI In General
231Hk53 Evidence of Employment
231Hk55 k. Presumptions and Burden of
Proof. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k40(l) Master and Servant)
Employee has burden of establishing existence of
implied-in-fact contract provision, that is, employee
must show that although there was no express contract provision to this effect, parties nevertheless
agreed that employment would not be at will.
161 Labor and Employment 231H €=>36
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk31 Contracts
231Hk36 k. Implied Contracts. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant)
If parties actually intended implied-in-fact employment agreement and agreement is of such nature that
it is possible to operate as contract term, court will
give effect to parties' intention by enforcing agreement as implied-in-fact contract provision.
121 Labor and Employment 231H €=>58
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk58 k. Questions of Law and Fact as to
Employment Status. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k43 Master and Servant)
Existence of implied-in-fact employment agreement
is question of fact which turns on objective manifestation of parties' intent; however, if evidence presented is such that no reasonable jury could conclude
that parties agreed to limit employer's right to terminate employee, it is appropriate for court to decide

issue as matter of law.
181 Labor and Employment 231H €==>36
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk31 Contracts
231Hk36 k. Implied Contracts. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant)
For implied-in-fact contract term to exist in employment context, it must meet requirements for offer of
unilateral contract; there must be manifestation of
employer's intent that is communicated to employee
and sufficiently definite to operate as contract provision, and manifestation of employer's intent must be
of such nature that employee can reasonably believe
that employer is making offer of employment other
than employment at will.
121 Labor and Employment 231H € ^ 3 6
231H Labor and Employment
231 HI In General
231Hk31 Contracts
231Hk36 k. Implied Contracts. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant)
While exact parameters concerning nature of evidence jury may properly consider to arrive at parties'
intent and to fix terms of employment relationship,
for purposes of implied-in-fact contract term, have
yet to be determined, it is clear that evidence must be
sufficient to fulfill requirements of unilateral offer.
HOI Labor and Employment 231H €=>51
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy
Statements
231Hk51 k. Particular Cases. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant)
Procedures set forth in employee handbook for terminating employee did not create implied-in-fact
contract for employment other than employment at
will, where handbook contained clear and conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual liability
and stating employer's intent to maintain at-will rela-
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tionship with employees.
[Ill Labor and Employment 231H €==>51
231H Labor and Employment
231 HI In General
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy
Statements
231Hk51 k. Particular Cases. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant)
Employee's compliance with handbook procedures
during employee's annual appraisals and his termination did not create implied-in-fact contract modifying
at-will employment relationship established upon
distribution of handbook, where handbook contained
clear and conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual liability and stating employer's intent to
maintain at-will relationship with employees.
*998 Philip C. Patterson, Ogden, for Johnson.

ministering Johnson's*999 nine employee appraisals,
Thiokol complied with the procedures set out in the
handbook. However, the introduction of the handbook contains clear and conspicuous language stating
that the provisions of the manual are not intended to
operate as terms of an employment contract.
FN2. The handbook provides in part:
GENERAL POLICY
It is the policy of Morton Thiokol, Inc., to
establish reasonable rules of employment
conduct and to ensure compliance with
these rules through a program consistent
with the best interests of the Company and
its employees.
Violation of rules of conduct may result in
one of the following forms of corrective
discipline:

Mary Anne Q. Wood, Salt Lake City, for Morton
Thiokol Co.

• Employee Discussion

HALL, Chief Justice:

• Notice of Caution

Plaintiff Billy Johnson sought to recover damages
resulting from the involuntary termination of his employment. From an entry of summary judgment in
favor of defendant Morton Thiokol, Inc. ("Thiokol"),
Johnson appeals. When reviewing an order granting
summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts are viewed
in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion FNl

• Involuntary suspension without pay, not
to exceed five days

FN1. Cidp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall
795 P.2d 650. 651 (Utah 1990).
Johnson was hired by Thiokol on February 12, 1979,
as a process inspector and was continuously employed at Thiokol until the date of his termination,
July 20, 1988. At no time during his employment did
he enter into an express contract with Thiokol which
restricted Thiokol's ability to terminate his employment. Throughout Johnson's tenure, Thiokol published and distributed an employee handbook. The
text of the handbook contains several pages prescribing Thiokol's policy concerning employee disciplinary, appraisal, and grievance procedures.1^2 In ad-

• Termination
To assure uniform treatment of all employees, Employee Relations must approve all cases of notice of caution, suspension, or termination prior to implementation. Individual supervisors are responsible for recommending disciplinary
action, but ultimate authority with the respect to discipline rests with the appropriate vice president for any given case.
CATEGORIES OF RULE INFRACTIONS
• Category 1-Infractions that may result in
an Employee Discussion or Notice of
Caution. Termination or suspension can
occur under Category 1, if the severity of
the violation warrants such action.
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• Category 2-Infractions that will result in
a Notice of Caution and could result in
disciplinary suspension or termination.
Some rules of conduct may apply to either
category. A supervisor's determination of
the category for which discipline is recommended will include consideration of
the seriousness of the violation, the employee's past record, and extenuating circumstances. Suspension without pay, for
up to five working days, may be applied if
warranted in connection with Notices of
Caution.
Two Notices of Caution for the same offense, or a total of four Notices of Caution
for any combination of offenses, within a
two-year period, may result in involuntary
termination.
Notices of Caution become void after two
years, and Human Resources is responsible for purging the official personnel files.

PROMOTIONS
CREASES

AND

PAY

IN-

Like most people, you are probably looking forward to increased responsibility
and promotion, and Morton Thiokol recognizes this as a natural and worthy desire.
Performance evaluations provide a guide
for improvement of your work and a basis
for your promotions and merit increases in
pay.
In the beginning of July 1988, Thiokol implemented
a leak check test procedure for verifying the proper
placement and seal of Thiokol's redesigned O-rings,
which are used in space shuttle rocket motors. Johnson, although he had not received adequate training
regarding the new process, was assigned to inspect
the leak check test procedure. For the three weeks
prior to the date of the incident which resulted in his

termination, Johnson and all members of the inspection crews worked mandatory overtime in order to
meet Air Force-imposed deadlines. In connection
with these deadlines, the inspectors were urged by
upper management to avoid shut-down orders because such orders would result in unacceptable
scheduling pressure.
When Johnson arrived at work on July 8, 1988, the
technicians were involved in setting up five simultaneous operations. It had become common practice to
perform numerous operations simultaneously even
though there was only one inspector assigned to the
building. An inspector was required to witness each
operation, but due to the simultaneous "setups," it
was impossible for one inspector to observe each
procedure. Johnson therefore prioritized those areas
where actual observations were made. At one point,
he was notified that a setup had been completed. He
glanced at the setup but did not complete the thirtynine-step breakdown required to verify the procedure.
However, he verified that he had completed the appropriate inspection. Due to the inadequate inspection, Johnson failed to notice that certain hoses had
been improperly installed.
The next day, during a routine test operation, excess
pressure caused by the improperly installed hoses
forced the O-rings out of their groove and damaged
some insulation lining on the motor. The damage
required that the test motor be disassembled to make
repairs, causing a twenty-day delay in the test firing
of the rocket motor. The incident resulted in an investigation by NASA officials and was highly publicized
in both the local and national news media. Johnson
and the employee who installed the hoses were terminated.
Johnson was terminated pursuant to the procedures
set out in the employee handbook. After his termination, he initiated grievance procedures which were
also conducted in accordance with the handbook. The
grievance was denied on the ground that Johnson was
terminated for "careless or inefficient performance of
duty," a ground which, according to the handbook,
can result in termination.
On February 22, 1989, Johnson commenced this action, claiming that Thiokol, by terminating his employment without good cause, breached an impliedin-fact contract provision. Thiokol filed a motion to
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dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) At the hearing, the motion was treated as a
motion for summary judgment under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 The trial court dismissed Johnson's case on the grounds that no implied-in-fact contract existed between Johnson and Thiokol and, alternatively, that Johnson was fired for good cause
Johnson appeals from these rulings
[11 Summary judgment is proper when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment*1000 as a matter of law E M
Therefore, when reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the evidence and all inferences that
may be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the
motion — The determination of whether, given this
view of the evidence, the moving party is entitled to a
judgment is a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness — The first issue presented on appeal,
therefore, is whether the trial court erred in ruling
that there was no implied contract provision limiting
Thiokol's ability to terminate Johnson If the trial
court was correct in this ruling, it will not be necessary to reach the second issue, whether Johnson was
fired for cause
FN3 Utah R Civ P 56(c), see, eg Clove)
v Snowhnd, 808 P 2d 1037. 1039 (Utah
1991), Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens x Utah Powei & Light Co , 776 P 2d
632, 634 (Utah 1989)
FN4 See, e g, Copper State Leasing Co x
Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co, 770
P2d 88 89 (Utah 1988). Payne v Mxers.
743 P 2d 186, 187-88 (Utah 1987)
FN5 See, e g, Blue Cross & Blue Shield x
State of Utah, 779 P 2d 634, 636 (Utah
1989), Bonham v Moigan, 788 P 2d 497.
499 (Utah 1989)
[2][3][4] Johnson argues that although he did not
have an express contract with Thiokol and was hired
for an indefinite term, he is entitled to damages resulting from the termination of his employment under
our recent case of Berube v Fashion Centre, Ltd~
Berube modified Utah's position on the doctrine of
employment at will In Utah, an employee hired for
an indefinite period is presumed to be an employee at

will who can be terminated for any reason whatsoever so long as the termination does not violate a
state or federal statute — Prior to Berube, in order
for indefinite-term employees to establish that their
employment was not at will, it was necessary to show
an express or implied stipulation as to the duration of
the employment or consideration beyond the rendering of services under the employment contract —
Berube modified this position by holding that the
terms of an employee manual can operate as lmphedm-fact contract terms rebutting the presumption of atwill employment and fixing the terms of the employee relationship — In addition, *1001 Berube
established that the continued performance of the
employee's duties is adequate consideration for such
an implied contract provision kM1
FN6 771 P 2d 1033 (Utah 1989)
FN7 Rosex Allied Dex Co, 719 P 2d 83,
84-85 (Utah 1986) There are state and federal statutes that limit an employer's ability
to terminate employees on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and
handicap See, eg, Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U S C fr2QQ0e-2(a)(l), Utah Code
Ann fr 34-35-6
There is dictum in Berube and in Hodges
v Gibson Products Co, 811 P2d 151
(Utah 1991), suggesting that Justices Durham, Stewart, and Zimmerman would
recognize a public policy exception to the
at-will doctrine See Beiuhe, 111 P 2d at
1042-43 (Durham, J , joined by Stewart,
J ), at 1051 (Zimmerman, J , concurring in
the result), Hodges, 811 P 2d at 165-68
(Stewart, J , joined by Durham, J ) , at 168
(Zimmerman, J , concurring in the result,
joined by Hall, C J ) Such an exception
would prevent employers from terminating employees for reasons that violate
public policy However, these justices do
not agree on the nature of such an exception See Berube, 111 P 2d at 1042-43
(Durham, J , joined by Stewart, J ) , at
1051 (Zimmerman, J , concurring m the
result), Hodges, 811 P2d at 165-68
(Stewart, J , joined by Durham, J ) , at 168
(Zimmerman, J , concurring in the result,
joined by Hall, C J ) In any event, the
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public policy exception has yet to be
clearly established in Utah.
FN8. Rose. 719 P.2d at 85; Bihlmaier v.
Carson. 603 P.2d 790. 792 (Utah 1979).
FN9. Berube is a plurality opinion. However, the opinions of Justices Durham and
Zimmerman establish that an employee
manual can rebut the presumption of at-will
employment by showing the existence of an
implied-in-fact contract term providing that
the employment is not at will. Beruhe, 111
P.2d at 1044-46, 1048 (Durham, J., joined
by Stewart, J.), at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result); see also Brehany v.
Nordstrom. Inc.. 812 P.2d 49. 54 (Utah
1991) (discussing Berube's holding).
The lead opinion in Berube, written by
Justice Durham and joined by Justice
Stewart, discussed three exceptions to the
at-will employment doctrine, the public
policy exception, the implied contract exception, and an exception based on the
implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. See Berube. Ill P.2d at 1042-47.
The decision, however, was based on the
theory that the presumption of at-will employment may be rebutted by implied contract terms. See Berube. Ill P.2d at 104950. All five justices agreed that an implied
contract provision may rebut the presumption of employment at will, Berube, 111
P.2d at 1044-46 (Durham, J., joined by
Stewart, J.), at 1050 (Howe, Assoc. C.J.,
concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.), at 105253 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result), although there was not complete
agreement on the nature of such a claim.
See Berube. Ill P.2d at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result).
Johnson's appeal is limited to an impliedin-fact contract claim.
FN 10. Berube. Ill P.2d at 1044-46, 1048
(Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 105253 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); see also Brehanv, 812 P.2d at 54.
[51f6][7] There are issues concerning the implied-in-

fact employee contracts recognized in Berube that
have yet to be addressed. However, Berube and its
progeny have established several principles regarding
these relationships. It is clear that the employee has
the burden of establishing the existence of an implied-in-fact contract provision, f M i that is, the employee must show that although there was no express
contract provision to this effect, the parties nevertheless agreed that the employment would not be at
wjH FKil jf t ^ e p ar ties actually intended such an
agreement and the agreement is of such a nature that
it is possible to operate as a contract term, a court
will give effect to the parties' intentions by enforcing
the agreement as an implied-in-fact contract provis j o n thil Yke ex i s tence of such an agreement is a
question of fact which turns on the objective manifestations of the parties' intent.*1^ As a question of fact,
the intent of the parties is primarily a jury question. 11 ^ However, if the evidence presented is such
that no reasonable jury could conclude that the parties agreed to limit the employer's right to terminate
the employee, it is appropriate for a court to decide
the issue as a matter of law. m1 ^
FN 11. Berube. Ill P.2d at 1044 (Durham,
J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result).
FN 12. Bembe. Ill P.2d at 1044 (Durham,
J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); see
Quality Performance Lines v. Yoho Automotive. 609 P.2d 1340. 1341 (Utah 1980).
FN13. Berube. Ill P.2d at 1044 (Durham,
J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); see
Quality Performance Lines, 609 P.2d at
1341-42.
FN 14. Bembe. Ill P.2d at 1044 (Durham,
J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); Quality
Performance Lines. 609 P.2d at 1341; Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille. 333 N.W.2d
622. 626 (Minn. 1983).
FN15. Brehany. 812 P.2d at 57: Caldwell v.
Ford. Bacon & Davis Utah. Inc.. Ill P.2d
483. 487 (Utah 1989): Berube. Ill P.2d at
1044 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), at
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1052 (Zimmerman, J , concurring m the result)
While the existence of an agreement
which forms the basis of an lmphed-mfact contract provision is a question of
fact, not all issues relating to implied employment contract provisions are factual
questions Indeed, we have held that when
terms of an employee manual constitute
an employment contract, the proper interpretation of the unambiguous terms of the
manual is an issue for the court Caldwell
111 P 2d at 485-86 If it is determined that
an agreement exists between an employee
and an employer, the same legal question
(I e , interpretation of unambiguous terms)
and the same factual questions (l e , interpretation of ambiguous terms) may arise
under the implied contract as may arise
under any agreement that is alleged to
form an express contract Therefore, in
some situations it is appropriate to uphold
a grant of summary judgment on a legal
question that arises under the alleged contract Id
FN 16 See Clover v Snow bud. 808 P 2d at
1040, Birkner v Salt Lake County, 771 P 2d
1053. 1057 (Utah 1989) (both cases hold
that court may decide factual questions
where reasonable minds cannot differ) See
generally Loose v Nature-All Corp, 785
P2d 1096. 1098 (Utah 1989) (court reviewed trial court finding of fact concerning
existence of lmplied-in-fact agreement for
substantial evidence)
[8] We have also addressed the nature of indefiniteterm employment relationships with implied-in-fact
contract provisions which limit an employer's right to
terminate an employee In Brehany v Nordstrom,
Inc, we stated that if an employee manual is to be
considered part of an employment contract, the terms
should be considered terms of a unilateral contract
— Several jurisdictions have taken such an app r o a c h 0 ^ Under a unilateral contract *1002 analysis, an employer's promise of employment under certain terms and for an indefinite period constitutes
both the terms of the employment contract and the
employer's consideration for the employment con-

tract The employee's performance of service pursuant to the employer's offer constitutes both the employee's acceptance of the offer and the employee's
consideration for the contract m15 Therefore, for an
implied-in-fact contract term to exist, it must meet
the requirements for an offer of a unilateral contract
There must be a manifestation of the employer's intent that is communicated to the employee ^ ^ and
sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provision E^21 Furthermore, the manifestation of the employer's intent must be of such a nature that the employee can reasonably believe that the employer is
making an offer of employment other than employment at will ^ ^ The unilateral nature of such an employment contract is important because it affects the
flexibility of the employment relationship
FN17 Brehanv. 812 P 2d at 56 n 2 Brehany involved an implied contract provision
limiting an employer's right to terminate an
indefinite-term employee A unilateral contract analysis may not be applicable where it
is alleged that an implied-in-fact contract exists, creating employment for a definite period
FN 18 Eg, Brooks v Trans World Airlines,
Inc . 574 F Supp 805. 809 (D Colo 1983).
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc v Campbell, 512
So 2d 725. 731 (Ala 1987). Pine Rner State
Bank 333 N W 2d at 626-27
FN19 See 1 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §
21 (1963), see also supra note 17
FN2Q See supra note 17
FN21 See Restatement (Second) of Contacts § 33 (1979) (must be certain enough to
determine existence of breach and appropriate remedy), see also Pme Rivei State Bank
333 N W 2d at 626
FN22 See supra note 17, see also, e g, Doe
v First Natl Bank of Chicago, 865 F 2d
864. 873 (7th Cir 1989) (applying Illinois
law), Leikvold v Valley View Community
Hosv, 141 Ariz 544. 688 P2d 170. 174
(1984). Hoffman-La Roche, Inc . 512 So 2d
at 734. Noik v Fettet Printing Co, 738
S W 2d 824. 827 (Kv Ct ADD 1987). Bailey
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v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d
120. 121-23 (N.D.1986).
In the case of unilateral contract for employment,
where an at-will employee retains employment
with knowledge of new or changed conditions, the
new or changed conditions may become a contractual obligation. In this manner, an original employment contract may be modified or replaced by
a subsequent unilateral contract. The employee's
retention of employment constitutes acceptance of
the offer of a unilateral contract; by continuing to
stay on the job, although free to leave, the employment supplies the necessary consideration for

FN23. Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at
627.
Indeed, such an approach is consistent with our case
law decided prior to Brehany where we have held
that the terms of an employee manual may constitute
terms of an employment contract even when the employees do not receive the manual until after they are
hired. 1 ^
FN24. Caldwell 111 P.2d at 485.
[9] However, it is not clear what type of evidence is
sufficient to raise a triable issue concerning the intentions of the parties and therefore the existence of an
implied-in-fact contract term. In cases where we have
held that there is a triable issue regarding the existence of such a term, we have based our decision
upon express statements of the employer. Specifically, we have held that employee manuals and bulletins containing policies for employee termination are
legitimate sources for determining the apparent intentions of the parties and for fixing the terms of the
employment relationship. 1 ^ However, we have not
seen fit to limit the evidence concerning the parties'
intent to such situations. Though the exact parameters
concerning the nature of the evidence a jury may
properly consider to arrive at the parties' intent and to
fix the terms of the employee relationship are yet to
be determined, it is clear that the evidence must be
sufficient to fulfill the requirements of a unilateral
offer.
FN25. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 57: Caldwell
111 P.2d at 485-86: Berube, 111 P.2d at

1Q44_46% 1Q48 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result).
[10"1|T1] Applying these principles to the instant case,
it is clear that the trial judge was correct in ruling as a
matter of law that no implied contract provision existed limiting Thiokol's right to terminate Johnson.* 1003 Johnson's allegations are insufficient to
create a triable issue concerning whether Johnson
could reasonably believe that Thiokol intended to
modify the employment relationship to provide that
an employee could be terminated only for good
cause. This can be seen by examining the specific
allegations upon which Johnson bases his claim.
Johnson argues that an implied-in-fact contract term
providing that he should be terminated only for good
cause is evidenced by the procedures set out in the
handbook for appraisals, discipline, and grievances;
the administration of its annual employee performance evaluation program; Johnson's and Thiokol's
joint use of the grievance procedures; and Thiokol's
stated good cause reason for terminating Johnson.
It is to be observed that Johnson's reliance on the
terms of the employee handbook is misplaced. We
have held that the terms of employee manuals may
raise triable issues concerning the existence of an
implied-in-fact contract. ^ ^ However, the manual
presently at issue contains clear and conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual liability and stating Thiokol's intent to maintain an at-will relationship
with its employees:
FN26. Brehanw 812 P.2d at 56-57:
Caldwell 111 P.2d at 485-86; Berube. 11 \
R2d at 1044-46, 1048 (Durham, J., joined
by Stewart, J.), at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result).
This book is provided for general guidance only.
The policies and procedures expressed in this book,
as well as those in any other personnel materials
which may be issued from time to time, do not create a binding contract or any other obligation or liability on the company. Your employment is for no
set period and may be terminated without notice
and at will at any time by you or the company. The
company reserves the right to change these policies
and procedures at any time for any reason.
Given this language, the only reasonable conclu-
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sion an employee or a juror could reach concerning
Thiokol's intention is that Thiokol intended to retain the right to discharge for any reason Treating
the handbook as part of the employment contract,
traditional rules of contract interpretation would
require us to read the handbook as a whole, harmonizing all of the provisions m 2 Z Therefore, the procedures in the handbook for terminating an employee must be read in light of the language in the
disclaimer which clearly reserved the right to discharge for any reason Under such an approach, the
most Johnson is entitled to is the right to challenge
his termination under the handbook's procedures,
not the right to be fired only for good cause We
also note that a number of jurisdictions have held
that a clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter
of law, prevents employee manuals or other like
material from being considered as implied-in-fact
E1SP8
contract terms
FN27 LPS Hosp v Capitol Life Ins. 765
P2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988), see also
Restatement (Second) of Contracts fr 202(2)
(1979) (a writing should be interpreted as a
whole)
FN28 The following cases have held as a
matter of law that a clear and conspicuous
disclaimer prevents the terms of an employee manual from being considered terms
of an employment contract Eg, Doe v
First Nat'l Bank of Chic azo, 865 F 2d at 873
(applying Illinois law), Dell \ Montgomery
Waid <£ Co. 811 F 2d 970, 972-73 (6th
Cir 1987) (applying Michigan law), Fletcher
v Wesley Medical Center, 585 F Supp
1260, 1264 (D Kan 1984), Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. 512 So 2d at 734, Bennett v
L\anston Hosp, 184 111 App 3d 1030, 133
111 Dec 113, 114-15, 540 N E 2 d 979, 98081 (1989), Nork, 738 S W 2 d at 827,
Castighone \ Johns Hopkins Hosp, 69
Md App 325, 517 A 2d 786, 793-94 (1986),
cert denied, 309 Md 325, 523 A 2d 1013
(1987), Pine River State Bank. 333 N W 2d
at 627, Bailex. 398 N W 2d at 121-23, Small
v Svunzs Indus. Inc. 292 S C 481. 357
SE 2d 452, 455 (1987), on appeal after remand 300 S C 481, 388 S E 2d 808 (1990),
Messerh v Asamera Minerals, (US) Inc ,
55 Wash App 811, 780 P2d 1327, 1330

(1989), cf Feiraro v Koelsch, 124 Wis 2d
154, 368 N W 2 d 666, 671 (1985) (hidden
disclaimer not effective)
Dicta in other jurisdictions also support
such an approach See, e g, Leikvold, 688
P2d at 174, Foley v Interactixe Data
Cory . 47 Cal 3d 654, 765 P 2d 373, 387,
254 CalRptr 211, 225 (Cal 1988),
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Mich. 408 Mich 579, 292 N W 2d 880,
895 (1980), Hinson v Cameron, 742 P 2d
549, 560 (Okla 1987)
Therefore, at the time the handbook was first distributed to Johnson, his employment* 1004 was at will
While it is true that subsequent expressed or implied
agreements could have modified the at-will employment relationship,11^ in the instant case the remaining allegations are insufficient to raise a triable issue
concerning a subsequent modification Aside from
the handbook itself, Johnson relies only on the fact
that Thiokol complied with the procedures m the
handbook during his annual employee appraisals and
his termination However, by complying with the
handbook Thiokol did nothing that was inconsistent
with the at-will employment relationship established
when the handbook was first distributed to Johnson
It cannot be reasonably concluded, therefore, that
Thiokol's actions communicated an intention to alter
an employment relationship that existed at the time
the handbook was distributed The trial court was
correct in granting summary judgment on the ground
that no implied-in-fact contract provision existed
between Thiokol and Johnson
FN 29 Although an implied provision cannot
contradict an express contract term,
Bieham, 812 P 2d at 55, an express contract
can be modified by a subsequent implied
contract 17A AmJur2d Contracts § 526
(1991), see also Brooks v Trans World Airlines, Inc , 574 F Supp at 810
Affirmed
HOWE, A C J , and ZIMMERMAN, J , concur STEWART, Justice (concurring in the result)
I agree with the majority that plaintiff has failed to
raise a factual issue as to whether his discharge
amounted to wrongful termination because it was
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without just cause. I write only because the majority
opinion, in my view, could be somewhat misleading
with respect to the law governing wrongful termination.
An indefinite-term employment contract creating a
presumption of an at-will relationship may be modified by the implied-in-fact contract provisions which
limit an employer's right to terminate an employee.
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1044
(Utah 1989). The issue in this case is whether plaintiff raised a factual dispute as to whether Thiokol's
express statement in its employee manual that employment was on an at-will basis was modified by the
disciplinary procedures outlined in the manual and by
Thiokol's course of dealings with its employees so
that Thiokol could discharge for just cause only.—
FNL The manual's disciplinary procedures
could have the effect of modifying the express disclaimer in the sense that both must
be read together and harmonized in construing the effect of the manual. This is a question of contract construction rather than a
subsequent modification as that term is generally used.
Generally, it is a question of fact as to whether the
parties acted in a manner to create implied contractual terms. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49,
55-57 (Utah 1991); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co.,
779 P.2d 668, 670 (Utah 1989). Contract terms implied from the conduct of the parties ordinarily stand
on an equal footing with express contract terms.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 4, J_9
(1981).— Implied contract terms may arise from
statements in an employee manual or from an employer's course of conduct. Implied terms may provide that an employee will be discharged only for just
cause, for particular misconduct, or after certain procedures have been followed by the employer. The
actual conduct of the parties may modify an express
statement in an employment manual that employment
is only on an at-will basis, just as any contract term
may be modified by the conduct of the parties.
FN2. Comment (a) to section 4 of the Restatement explains, "Just as assent may be
manifested by words or other conduct,
sometimes including silence, so intention to
make a promise may be manifested in Ian-

guage or by implication from other circumstances." Comment (a) to section 19 adds,
"[T]here is no distinction in the effect of the
promise whether it is expressed in writing,
or orally, or in acts, or partly in one of these
ways and partly in others."
The expanding sources of implied contract terms
have been reviewed in Goetz & Scott, The Limits of
Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
Calif.L.Rev. 261 (1985). The authors observe*1005
that the traditional common law approach to interpretation of contracts focused first and foremost on the
written agreement. Thus, "if the document appeared
clear and unambiguous in its terms, its meaning was
to be determined from the four corners of the instrument, without resort to extrinsic evidence." Id. at
273. Now, however, the law increasingly recognizes
that informal understandings and usages may be implied into contracts. This approach is typified by the
Uniform Commercial Code:
The [Uniform Commercial] Code, now joined by
the Second Restatement of Contracts, effectively
reverses the common law presumption that the parties' writing and the official law of contract are the
definitive elements of the agreement. Evidence derived from experience and practice can now trigger
the incorporation of additional, implied terms.
Id. at 274.
In Perty v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694,
33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). the United States Supreme
Court recognized that an employer's de facto policies
may give rise to a contractually enforceable employee right to be discharged for just cause only,
even in the presence of an employee policy manual
statement to the contrary. Id. at 600, 603, 92 S.Ct. at
2699, 2700. There are also federal and state court
decisions which hold that course of conduct may negate the effect of written disclaimers designed to insulate employers from contractual liability. See, e.g.,
Greene v. Howard Univ.. 412 F.2d 1128, 1134-35
(D.CCir.1969) (disclaimer asserting no contractual
duty on the part of employer does not necessarily
relieve employer of all obligations with respect to the
observance of its regulations); Karl v. General Motors Cory., 402 Mich. 926. 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978)
(reversed lower court's grant of summary judgment,
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remanded to consider employee claims regarding
interpretation of employee handbook and reliance
thereon, notwithstanding disclaimer purporting to
limit any employer contractual obligations); Schipani
v. Ford Motor Co.. 102 Mich.App. 606, 612-14, 302
N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (1981) (rejected for other reasons in Kostello v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 189
Mich.App. 241, 472 N.W.2d 71 (1991)) (under appropriate circumstances, oral promises may negate
the effect of disclaimers which are intended to absolve employers from liability for policies presented
in employee handbook). —
FN3. Indeed, some authorities assert that a
disclaimer in an employee handbook preserving the right to at-will discharge should
be recognized only when the disclaimer is
consistent with the employer's de facto employment policies. See, e.g., Note, Challenging the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
Through Modern Contract Theory, 16
U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 449, 461-63 (1983).
This Court has held that "an employer's internally
adopted policies and procedures concerning discharge can be sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of at-will employment and can, in effect,
become part of the contractual relationship between
the employer and the employee" and that "[b]reach of
the terms of this contractual relationship can result in
damages determined as in any other breach of contract action." Caldwell v. Ford. Bacon & Davis Utah,
Inc.. Ill P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989) (citing Berube.
Ill P.2d at 1044-46. 1050 (Durham, J., joined by
Stewart, J.), at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring
in the result)). That principle may also have the effect
of overcoming express assertions that a contract is atwill.
In the present case, Johnson relies on an implied-infact contract theory. He argues that the procedural
termination policies set forth in Thiokol's employee
handbook created an implied-in-fact agreement that
his employment would be terminated only for just
cause. Thiokol asserts that the employment relationship was strictly at-will and, therefore, that Johnson
could be terminated with or without cause. The majority places great emphasis on the disclaimer in the
employee handbook which purports to preserve the
at-will employment relationship, notwithstanding any
contrary practices by Thiokol and notwithstanding

the handbook's procedural termination policies. This
disclaimer is held to be a controlling manifestation of
Thiokol's intent as to the *1006 nature of the employment relationship. I think too much weight is
given that disclaimer.
If the issue were whether there is a material issue of
fact as to whether the declared at-will relationship
had been modified in any way at all by implied terms
arising from Thiokol's conduct and the other terms in
the manual, there would be a material issue of fact,
because Thiokol has indicated in its manual and in
practice that it terminates employees only after certain procedures are followed. The employee handbook contains a detailed program setting forth specific rules of conduct, procedures for disciplinary
actions, including discharge, and procedures for employee grievances. The handbook also sets forth
types of conduct for which disciplinary action would
or could be imposed and the possible consequences.
Thiokol in fact followed those procedures in the past
with respect to plaintiff and in the instant case by
complying with the extensive grievance procedures
set forth in the manual. Thus, there is clear evidence
of an implied-in-fact contract term with respect to
procedures to be followed when an employee is disciplined or discharged. The statement of these procedures in Thiokol's manual and their implementation
clearly could remove the employment relationship
from a strict at-will relationship. To that extent, a jury
certainly could find that the at-will relationship had
been modified, notwithstanding the manual's statement that employment was on an at-will basis.
Nevertheless, that is not what is critical in this case.
Johnson does not argue that Thiokol failed to comply
with its own procedures for termination. His complaint is that he could be discharged only with just
cause and that Thiokol had no just cause. Johnson has
not produced any evidence, however, that Thiokol's
termination procedures, its practice of employee performance evaluations, or any of its other employee
policies, provide a basis for concluding that Thiokol
can terminate only for just cause.
In the abstract, it may be arguable that the logical
implication of the termination procedures adopted by
Thiokol could be construed to require just cause or
good faith. However that may be, the evidence in this
case indicates that the procedures Thiokol has
adopted are intended to eliminate arbitrary conduct
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by Thiokol supervisors and to promote a degree of
uniformity in its firing practices. That does not, on
the facts of this case, impose an implied contract term
on Thiokol limiting it to discharge for just cause
only. If, however, there were evidence that the disciplinary procedures were in fact utilized to ensure that
an employee was discharged only for just cause, then
a jury could find that Thiokol's declaration that employment was on an at-will basis might be further
modified.^
FN4, In passing, I note that, on the facts, this
case is not altogether unlike Brehany v.
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah
19911, in which we held that the covenant of
good faith implied into every contract did
not modify the terms of an at-will employment contract to require that an employer
who discharges an employee have some
"good faith basis for doing so."
In sum, Thiokol could not be found to have breached
any implied terms of an employment contract when it
discharged Johnson because it followed the procedures set forth in the manual.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of
STEWART. J.
Utah,1991.
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